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Recently, a company named Adappcity Inc. launched a new application called UppstArt. The app purports to use blockchain technology to enable visual artists to
“track” art they sell such that i  and when it is later resold, they are able to en orce a so-called “resale royalty.” A resale royalty is a mandatory, predetermined
payment made by a subsequent purchaser to the artist who created the work. This payment is made in addition to whatever price the subsequent purchaser pays to
the seller o  the work.
According to a press release, UppstArt works by issuing a digital certificate o  authenticity that records and preserves in ormation about a work’s authorship and
price history. When a work o  art is resold, this record goes with it, and the artist is automatically paid a resale royalty. In other words, a subsequent purchaser
agrees to terms that include a resale royalty and the app automatically en orces this term. In this way, UppstArt looks like any other “smart contract” currently
pervading the Internet o  Things (IoT).
Smart contracts give manu acturers o  smart products and devices—such as cars and speakers—the ability to remotely, and unilaterally, en orce terms o  service.
For example, rental car companies can use tracking devices to charge customers punitive  ees  or driving outside o  state lines where fine print in the rental contract
so prohibits. Sonos, maker o  smart speaker systems, recently announced changes to its data collection and privacy policy that users are obligated to accept in order
to receive necessary so ware updates. Without those updates, the speakers will cease to  unction.
The interesting thing about UppstArt is that it aims to en orce a term—the payment o  a resale royalty— that has been repeatedly considered and explicitly rejected
by Congress. Previous bills introducing a resale royalty include the American Royalties Too (“ART”) Act o  2015, the Equity  or Visual Artists Act o  2011, the
Visual Artists Rights Act o  1987, the Visual Artists Rights Amendment o  1986, and the Visual Artists’ Residual Rights Act o  1978. Most recently, the Ninth
Circuit Court o  Appeals struck down Cali ornia’s Resale Royalty Act—legislation that allowed artists to collect 5% o  all secondary market sales o  their work
conducted either in Cali ornia or by a Cali ornia-based company—as an unconstitutional violation o  the Commerce Clause.
To date, all legislative attempts to institute a resale royalty have  ailed. This is so despite the existence o  an equivalent droit de suite in the European Union, and
despite a recent report  rom the Copyright Office urging their passage. The Copyright Office’s report relies heavily on the  act that visual artists engage in a “one-
shot” market—i.e., they earn money on a single sale o  a work, as opposed to, say, a recording artist, who may earn repeatedly on copies o  her work—to conclude
that these artists are disadvantaged by the current copyright system and might be helped by institution o  a resale royalty. Congress’ continued reticence toward
adoption o  a resale royalty has been applauded by some commentators who see the concept as  avoring elite artists at the cost o  lesser-known artists, and decried
by others who view resale royalties as generative o  art more generally.
Regardless o  the propriety o  resale royalties, the UppstArt app imposes a payment that Congress not only doesn’t recognize, but has also made clear is not owed.
It is this regulatory override, and extra-regulatory en orcement by private ordering, that differentiates UppstArt  rom many other smart contracts.
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To be sure, private override o  public law is not new. For example, Section 1201 o  the Digital Millennium Copyright Act arguably allows content owners to use
Digital Rights Management (“DRM”) technology to block potential  air uses o  content that copyright law might otherwise allow. Like DRM, UppstArt uses
technology to automate unilateral en orcement o  extra-regulatory terms. Unlike DRM, however, UppstArt uses technology to introduce a new right—in this case,
a right to payment— or which there is no statutory basis.
Commenters have long expressed concern about rights accretion in the copyright context, blaming a combination o  statutory ambiguity—particularly in the
context o   air use—and high-stakes penalties  or in ringement. For example, the New York Times, in a notorious abundance o  caution, licensed  our lines o 
poetry  or an editorial that clearly qualified as parody (thereby exempting it  rom licensing). The primary concern is that over-licensing can lead to a  eedback loop
in which others in the space  ace an expectation o  licensing notwithstanding the absence o  a legal obligation.
UppstArt’s use o  blockchain technology potentially raises the stakes. Unlike rights accretion resulting  rom statutory ambiguity, which might be mitigated with
simpler statutory language and/or clearer precedent, the technological rights accretion exhibited by UppsArt doesn’t suggest an obvious solution. Perhaps none is
needed. An alternate interpretation o  UppstArt’s business model might be as a signal to the legislature that not only can the market bear such a royalty, but even
what that value might look like. As technology enables more o  such regulatory overrides, it will be interesting to see i  they tend toward ne arious, unilateral term-
setting, or instead serve to improve the in ormation available to lawmakers.
Kristelia A. García (@kristelia) is an associate pro essor at the University o  Colorado Law School, where she teaches copyright, trademark, and property. She also serves as a
director o  the Silicon Flatirons Center  or Law, Technology and Entrepreneurship. Prior to entering academia, Kristelia practiced in firms and in-house in the music industry,
most recently at Universal Music Group. Comments, compliments, and criticism couched as such welcome at kristelia@colorado.edu.
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